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The self-declared status of one of China\u2019s largest shadow banks as \u201cseverely insolvent\u201d has revealed another crack in a financial system being stressed by the abrupt and disruptive shifts in the country\u2019s economic growth model and trajectory.<\/p>\n
Last week, Zhongzhi Enterprise Group warned its investors that it would be unable to repay them, saying that it had conducted a due diligence exercise that showed it was severely insolvent and \u201cfacing high risks of sustaining normal operations.\u201d<\/p>\n
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Chinese President Xi Jinping. Beijing has little choice but to intervene, given the property sector\u2019s crucial role in the economy.<\/span>Credit: <\/span>AP<\/cite><\/p>\n In the near term, it said, \u201cthe amount of assets that can be used to repay investors is far below the total liabilities.\u201d<\/p>\n Zhongzhi has total liabilities of between 420 billion yuan ($89 billion) and 460 billion yuan ($98 billion) but total assets of only 200 billion yuan, so it has a deficiency of as much as $56 billion.<\/p>\n The company, which said it had been \u201clargely out of control\u201d after the death of its founder, Zie Zhikun nearly two years ago and a subsequent exodus of senior executives, once managed more than a trillion yuan of assets. The first signs that it was under pressure came in August, when it missed payments to an estimated 150,000 of its investors.<\/p>\n Zhongzhi is one of the largest of the trust companies, or shadow banks, in China that raise funds from households by offering much higher returns than banks and invest them in stocks, bonds, commodities and real estate, including loans to developers.<\/p>\n Zhongzhi appears to have heavy exposures to China\u2019s troubled property development sector, both through loans and ownership of properties bought from some of the teetering property giants like China Evergrande and Country Garden.<\/p>\n It\u2019s not alone. The $4.5 trillion trust sector is though to have an exposure to Chinese\u2019s depressed real estate sector of more than $1 trillion, although the sector is so opaque it could even be more.<\/p>\n While the sector represents only about five per cent of China\u2019s financial system its links with property developers and developments and the developers\u2019 importance to local governments\u2019 revenues create a worrisome, self-fuelling and destructive loop for policymakers in Beijing.<\/p>\n The downturn in the property sector that is now continuing to spread like a cancer within China\u2019s economy and financial system started when, after decades of an increasingly speculative boom in property (aided by central and local governments that saw construction as a vehicle, with infrastructure investment, for stimulating the economy whenever growth was threatened), Xi Jinping introduced limits on developers\u2019 leverage in late 2020.<\/p>\n Last week, Zhongzhi Enterprise Group warned its investors that it would be unable to repay them.<\/span>Credit: <\/span>Bloomberg<\/cite><\/p>\n He wanted to shift China\u2019s economy away from speculative activity towards a more sustainable, albeit lower-growth, economic model.<\/p>\n The sector imploded almost instantly and is still reeling, with a host of developers defaulting on their debts and leaving a vast number of housing projects \u2013 homes which households and trusts had paid for under the pre-sales model the developers used to finance their projects \u2013 uncompleted.<\/p>\n It also undermined the finances of local governments, which relied on land sales to the developers and value-added taxes for much of their revenue.<\/p>\n Previous efforts to stabilise the property sector have been piecemeal and largely ineffective. Beijing has made it easier and cheaper for prospective buyers to get mortgages, lowering the amounts needed as down payments and reducing interest rates on new mortgages. The authorities have also extended some new loans to some developers to try to get projects completed.<\/p>\n Property investment and sales, however, have continued to shrink.<\/p>\n While the International Monetary Fund has recommended Beijing allow distressed developers to fail, allow house prices to find their own level, fund completion of half-completed developments and help any viable developers to repair their balance sheets, the authorities have until now preferred to keep the companies on life support while allowing foreign investors in their bonds to be wiped out.<\/p>\n That might be about to change, with the authorities mulling a new approach to trying to salvage the better-managed developers.<\/p>\n One of the key measures in a new support package being put together for the sector envisages a direction to state-owned banks to provide unsecured short term loans \u2013 working capital \u2013 to 50 designated developers. Apparently Country Garden, China\u2019s biggest developer, is on the list.<\/p>\n China has has made it easier and cheaper for prospective buyers to get mortgages, lowering the amounts needed as down payments and reducing interest rates on new mortgages, but its property sector continues to sink. <\/span>Credit: <\/span>Bloomberg<\/cite><\/p>\n With an estimated $670 billion needed to stabilise the sector, even limiting the aid to the 50 developers regarded as worthy of assistance is going to involve significant new loans to troubled borrowers being taken on by banks that, while well capitalised, are already experiencing a significant increase in non-performing loans and pressure on their margins from a slowing economy.<\/p>\n Granting unsecured finance to companies already in trouble is akin to taking up equity in them and accepting the equity risk but the authorities obviously think the risk of failing to halt the continuing deterioration of the property sector is greater than the risks that would be taken on by the banks.<\/p>\n They need, if the industry is to be stabilised, to keep the better developers alive and able to complete the millions of currently incomplete apartment projects if they are to defuse the threat the sector poses to economic growth and financial stability.<\/p>\n Zhongzhi\u2019s distress is a warning bell that the property crisis has infected the trust sector and is impacting, or could impact, the millions of investors and trillions of dollars of assets within it.<\/p>\n The key to preventing the steep downturn in property from doing more damage to China\u2019s economy and financial system is halting the downward spiral in prices and helping those developers experiencing liquidity rather than solvency issues stay afloat.<\/p>\n Zhongzhi isn\u2019t the only trust company that is insolvent \u2013 earlier this year New China Trust became the first to be declared bankrupt in decades \u2013 and more failures would only compound the challenges in stabilising the property sector while putting the other asset classes the trusts are invested in under pressure if they are forced into distressed sales to generate liquidity.<\/p>\n The key to preventing the steep downturn in property from doing more damage to China\u2019s economy and financial system is halting the downward spiral in prices and helping those developers experiencing liquidity rather than solvency issues stay afloat.<\/p>\n Whether directing state-owned banks to prop the developers up is the best way to approach the problem is questionable, but it is clear that either Beijing bails out a significant number of large developers and help fund completion of their projects or, as the IMF recommended, it allows them to fail and leaves it to the market to decide which companies and projects are salvageable.<\/p>\n Given how central property is to China\u2019s economy and financial system, it isn\u2019t surprising that the authorities\u2019 preference is for intervention rather than leaving it to market forces to sort out the mess, with all the destructive waves that might create within the financial system.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
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